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STATE ADOPTION OF 
FEDERAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE 




T here is little doubt that in order to best fulfill public policy goals, coordination between the federal and state governments is 
desirable.' Coordination has been sought over the years, for example, 
by federal grants-in-aid,2 and the enactment of federal laws which are 
dependent upon state law.S One technique which has been employed 
by the states to further coordinate state and federal law is incorpora-
tion of federal law into state law. Although it is beyond question that 
there is no constitutional problem when a state legislature adopts 
existing federal law or regulations: constitutional questions do arise 
*Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., University of 
Pennsylvania; J.D., George Washington University School of Law. 
'See People v. DeSilva, 32 Mich. App. 707, ltl~ N.W.2d 362, 364 (1971); Clark, 
Interdependent Federal and State Law as Form of Federal-State Cooperation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 
539 (1938). 
'See Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Worker Protection: The Failure of the Regulatory 
Model, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 935, 962-963 n.7-9 (1982); Comment, Federal Grants and the 
Tenth Amendment: "Things As The)' Are" and Fiscal Federalism, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 130 
(1981); Tomlinson and Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-In-Aid 
Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600 (1972); Comment, 
Governmental Techniques for Ihe Conse11Jation alld Utiliwtioll of Water Resources: An Analysis 
and Proposal, 56 YALE L.J. 276, 300 (1946). 
'See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 (1957)(interpreting Federal Back Bass 
Act which relies on state law to define circumstances when it would be improper to 
transport fish over state lines); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 
to .S.c. ~ 1961 (I )(A) (state law crimes as acts of racketeering a..:tivity); See generally 
Mermin, Cooperative Federalism: "Cooperative Federalism" Again: State and Municipal Legisla-
tion Penalizing Violatioll of Ex is ling and Fulure FederalRequirements: 1, 57 YALE L.J. I (1947). 
"See, e.g., Adoue v. State, 408 So. 2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1982); Lee v. State, 635 P.2d 1282 
(Mont. 1981); State v. Williams, 119 Ariz. 595, 583 P.2d 251. 254 (1978); People v. 
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when a state attempts to adopt future federal laws or regulations.5 The 
regional reporters are replete with cases stating that statutes which 
incorporate future federal law are unconstitutional because they im-
permissably delegate legislative power from the state legislatures to the 
federal government.6 The basic rationale of these cases is that by 
incorporating future federal law, the state legislatures are abdicating 
their legislative power because they maintain no control over Congress 
or any federal agency. 7 
The purpose of this article is to discuss state adoption of future 
federal law. After presenting a brief introduction to the delegation 
doctrine, the article will analyze cases from various states which have 
addressed challenges on delegation grounds to state statutes which 
attempt to adopt future federal law. This analysis will show that state-
ments such as that made by one state court that "the courts have 
uniformly and without deviation held that any attempt by the legisla-
ture to incorporate into our law future [federal] regulations is an 
unconstitutional delegation"8 is misleadingly broad in that they suggest 
that states can never incorporate future federal law. The article will 
then attempt to provide a framework which differs from the one 
usually employed by courts in analyzing this issue. Finally, the article 
will apply this approach to a few substantive areas where states have 
attempted to adopt future federal law. 
II. THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
The basis of the delegation (or non-delegation) doctrine is that there 
can be no delegation of a delegated power.9 Having been delegated the 
DeSilva, 189 N.W.2d at %5; State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467.183 N.W.2d 911 (1971); 
Thorpe v. Mahin. 43111. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633, 640 (1969); Anderson v. Tiemann. IIl2 
Neb. 393,155 N.W.2d :>22, 325 (1967); Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 71 P.2d 
209.213 (1937); People v. Downes, 49 Mich. App. 532, 212 N.W.2d 314. 317-18 (1973). 
'See, e.g .• State v. Williams. 5H3 P.2d at 254-55; Freimuth v. State, 272 So. 2d 473, 476 
(Fla. IY7:!); State v.Johnson. H4 S.D. 556, 173 N.W.2d 894. 895 (1971); People v. DeSilva, 
189 N.W.2d at 3ti5 n.5; lIorner's Markctlnc. v. Tri-County Mel. Transportation Disl., 
20 Ore. App. 385.467 P.2d (ii I (1970), affd, 256 Ore. 98, 471 P.2d 798 (Or. 1970): \' die 
v. Bishop. 55 Wash. 2d 1081,347 P.2d 1081, 1091 (1959); See gel/erally Annol., 133 
A.L.R. 401 (1941). 
"See, e.g., Adone v. State, 408 So. 2d at 570; State v. Urquhart. 50 Wash. 2<1 131. ~ III 
P.2d 261, 264 (1957); Brock v. Superior Court. 71 P.2d 2()\J; State v. Webber, 25 Me. 319. 
133 A. 7:~8 (1926); Dearborn Independent v. City of Dearborn, 331 Mich. 447, 49 
N.W.2d 370 (1951); Smithberger v. Banning. 129 Neb. 651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935); 
Florida Indusl rial Comm. v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 15:) Fla. 55. 10 So. 2d 793 (1943); 
Sa IIl'l} AnnOl., 133 A.LR. 401 (1941). 
'A,t. .tll' v. Siale. 408 So. 2d al :,7(); State \'. Williams, :)1(\ 1'.2d at 255: State v. Urquhart, 
:~ I 01'.2<1 at 264; Cl'Owly v. Thornhrough, 294 S.W.2d li2.66 (Ark. 1956); Mermin. SliPi'll 
note 3, at 4. 
"Freimuth v. State, 272 So. 2d at 476. 
"Shankland v. Washington.:; Pet. :190. 395 (U.S. IH31). 
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power to make laws by the electorate, a legislature, it is argued, cannot 
redelegate this power to another lawmaking body. 10 Most of the cases 
involving the delegation doctrine concern the validity of a delegation 
from a legislature (a state legislature or Congress) to an administrative 
agency (state or federal). II Case law has developed the proposition that 
delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies will be up-
held as long as the delegation contains sufficient standards; in this way 
the agency is provided with guidance for the exercise of its discretion, 
and a court performing its review function is provided a measure 
against which challenged administrative action can be judged. 12 
As mentioned above, the delegation doctrine has also been applied 
in cases involving state statutes adopting federal law. In order to 
evaluate the application of the traditional delegation doctrine to the 
state adoption cases, it is important to emphasize that the delegation 
doctrine is based on protecting the ideals of democratic political 
theory. The delegation doctrine ensures that important choices of 
social policy are made by officials who are politically responsive and 
accountable to the popular will. I~ It is feared that delegations of legisla-
tive power "create repositories of power largely insulated from the 
constraints of the democratic process."14 Excessive delegation may 
indicate a legislature's unwillingness to make the difficult policy chuices 
necessary to implement meaningful policy. A doctrine which limits 
delegation prohibits those who have sought the public trust through 
the electoral process to "pass the buck" to those who are not politically 
accountable. 15 
III. JUDICIAL REACTION TO VALIDITY OF 
ST ATE STATUTES ADOPTING FEDERAL LAW 
State statutes adopting federal law which have been challenged as 
improper delegations of legislative power have involved various sub-
'"J. LOCKE, OF CI VIL GOVERNMENT 141 ("The legislative cannot transfer the power of 
making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they 
who have it cannot pass it over the other"), noted in B. SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
35 (1984). 
"See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947)(delegation from Congress to Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board upheld); People v. Tibbitts, 56 III. 2d 56, 305 N.E.2d 152 
(1973)(delegation from Illinois legislall1rc to Illinois Human Relations Commission held 
invalid). 
"See Industrial Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) 
(justice Rehnquist concurring). 
"/d.; Accord, Wright, Beyond Di.lcretionaryjustice, 81 YALE L..J. 575 (1972). 
"Cottrell v. Denver, 636 P.2d 703, 709 (Colo. 1981). 
"Wright, supra note 13, at 575; B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 140 
(\ 983). 
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stantive areas ranging from migratory birds l6 to branch banking. 17 
Although the substantive areas differ from case to case, the judicial 
analysis in these cases does not appear to depend on any consideration 
of the substantive area being regulated. As discussed below, this is a 
major weakness of the cases. To illustrate the current state of the law on 
the issue of state adoption of federal law , this article will focus on cases 
involving state adoption of federal drug laws, federal highway speed 
limits, federal tax laws, and federal price control laws. 
A. State Adoption of Federal Drug Laws 
In State v. Dougall,18 the issue was whether valium was a controlled 
substance under Washington law. Valium had not been designated a 
controlled substance by the Washington legislature, nor had the 
appropriate state agency held any rulemaking proceeding on valium. 
The state agency had designated valium a controlled substance, how-
ever, pursuant to a state law adopted in 1971 which provided that if a 
substance is designated a controlled substance under federal law, the 
substance similarly is controlled under Washington law effective thirty 
days after its publication in the Federal Register, unless within that 
thirty-day period, the state agency objects to the designation. 19 If the 
agency objects, a rulemaking proceeding is required. 20 If no objection is 
taken by the agency, however, rule making is not required for the 
federal law to become the state law. In the case of valium, the drug 
became controlled under federal law in June 1975,21 the state agency 
did not object, and inJuly 1975, all state prosecutors were notified of 
valium's designation. 22 The Washington Supreme Court, however, 
reversed a conviction of defendant Dougall who was charged with 
possession of valium in 1976. The court ruled that the adopting statute 
was unconstitutional because of its attempt to adopt a federal law 
enacted after Washington's drug law had been enacted. The statute 
WPowers v. Owen. 419 P.2d 277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966). 
17McHt:t1.y State Bank v. Harris, 89 Ill.2d 542, 434 N.E.2d 1144 (1982). Other 
substantive areas covered by such statutes helude lIIinilllulII wages, Crowly v. Thorn-
brough, 294 S.W.2d 62; citrus fruit grading, Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 
(1940); time zones. Dawson v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958); foodstamps, State \'. 
Rodriguez, 365 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1978); livestock, Seale v. McKennon, 336 P.2d 34() (Ore. 
1959). 
1"89 Wash.2d 118,570 P.2d 135 (1977). 
1"570 1'.2d at. 13ti citing WASH. REV. CUUE § 69.50.201(d). 
2°ld. 
"lid. at 137. 
221d. 'It 136. The notice infurmed the state prosecutors that valium had been con-
sidered a controlled substance under state law since July 2, 1975, thirty days after its 
designation by the federal government. 
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was invalid because it permitted law to become binding in Washington 
"without appearing in either a state statute or the state administrative 
code."2s The power to define a crime in Washington, the court 
reasoned, belongs solely to the Washington legislature.24 
State v. Thompson2\ which involved a Missouri drug statute, should be 
compared to Dougall. Although at first blush the Missouri law appears 
almost identical to the one struck down in Dougall, the Thompson court 
held it to be "significantly different," and consequently constitutionaU6 
The Missouri statute provided that if any substance was "designated, 
rescheduled or deleted as a controlled substance under federal law," 
the state Division of Health "shall similarly control the substance" thirty 
days after publication in the Federal Register by issuinp; an order, 
unless the Division of Health before the thirty -day period, objected to 
the inclusion, rescheduling or deletion.27 If the state agency objected, a 
public hearing was required.28 Thompson involved the drug pentazo-
cine. That drug had been listed as a controlled substance by the federal 
Drug Enforcement Administration,29 and because the state agency did 
not object, it likewise became controlled in Missouri. In defense of the 
charge of possession of this drug, defendant Thompson argued that 
the "automatic inclusion of substances by inaction" of the Division of 
Health was unconstitulional.:'" 
The Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, rejected this claim stating 
that defendant "overlooked" the role that the Division of Health 
played in classifying drugs.sl The court viewed the statute not as an 
automatic adoption statute, but one which required the state agency to 
"act affirmatively" in deciding whether to object to the federal 
decision.s2 The Washington statute held invalid in Dougall differed 
from the Missouri statute in that, pursuant to the former statute, if the 
2'ld. at 137. 
2'ld. at 138. The court cited State v. Emery, 55 Ohio 364, 45 N.E. 319 (1896) which 
involved a prosecution for the sale of drugs which were not controlled under standards 
promulgated by the United States Pharmacopoeia which existed at the time an Ohio law 
was enacted, but had only become listed as a controlled substance under a later revision 
of the Pharmacopoeia's list. The court reversed a conviction obtained under this statute 
stating that "to hold that the sale could thus be made unlawful would be equivalent to 
holding that the revisers of the book could create and define the offense-a power which 
belongs to the legislative body and cannot be delegated." 45 N.E. at 320. 
25627 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1982). 
26ld. at 301. 
21 Jd. at 30~. 
2·ld. 
"l9ld. at 299. 
>Old. at 301. 
"ld. at 302-03. 
"ld. at 301. 
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federal government classified a drug, then "the substance shall be con-
trolled," while with the Missouri law, if the federal government clas-
sified a drug "the Division of Health shall similarly control" the 
substance.ss The court stated that because a substance could be con-
trolled in Missouri only if the state agency decided not to object, "no 
delegation of power to control substances in Missouri has been dele-
gated to the federal government."S4 Unlike the Washington statute 
which empowered a federal agency to classify drugs in Washington, in 
Missouri it "is the Division of Health, not a federal agency which 
schedules a substance."s5 
B. State Adoption of Federal Highway Speed Limits 
During the energy crisis of 1974, Congress enacted legislation which 
in effect denied federal highway funds to any state which had a max-
imum highway speed limit in excess of 55 miles per hour.s6 In response 
to these federal acts Montana, in 1974, enacted a statute providing that 
the 
attorney general shall declare by proclamation a speed limit in the state 
whenever the establishment of such a speed limit by the state is required by 
federal law as a condition to the state's continuing eligibility to receive funds 
authorized by the Federal Highway Act of 1973 and all acts amendatory 
thereto or any other federal statute .... The attorney general shall by further 
proclamation change the speed limit adopted pursuant to this section to 
comply with federallaw. 57 
In 1974, the attorney general of Montana issued a proclamation setting 
a 55 miles per hour speed limit. The Montana Supreme Court in Lee v. 
State,08 held the statute unconstitutional because of its "mandatory 
directions to the attorney general to proclaim a speed limit not less than 
that required by federal law," and "to terminate such proclaimed speed 
limit whenever such a speed is no longer required by federallaw."s9 
"Id. at 302. 
"Id. 
'SId. 
'"Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Slal. lC15 
(1974) ami Ff'rlf'r~l·A irl Hil!hwav Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-643, (codified as 
amended at i!3 U.S.C. § lUI et seq. (1982)). 
"MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-304, noted in Lee v. State, 635 P.2d 1282 (Mont. 1981). 
Prior to 1974, the maximum speed limit in Montana was 65 mph on interstate and 
divided highways, and 50 Illph 011 other roads. State v. Shurtliff, 635 P.2d 1294, 1295. 
'"635 P.2d 1282 (Mont. 1981). Plaintiff alleged a violation ofhisright to drive in excess 
of 55 mph "as he was accustomed to doing prior to the issuance of the proclamation." Id. 
at 1284. 
"'1.1. u. ; 2dl).1 lie court distinguished Masquelette v. State, 579 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1979). State v. Dumler. 221 Kan. 386. 559 P.2d 798 (1977). and Stale v. 
Padley. 195 Neb. 358. 237 N.W.2d 883 (1976) on the grounds thatthosejurisdictions had 
adopted statutes which committed the decision whether to adopt the new federal law to 
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This violated the principle followed "almost without exception" that a 
state legislature cannot adopt as state law "changes in the federal laws 
or regulations to occur in the future."4o 
The Montana situation should be compared to that in Kansas, where 
in order to be eligible for federal highway funds under the 1974 
federal acts, the legislature enacted a series of laws establishing a 55 
miles per hour maximum speed limit, but with the provision that "in 
the event that the Congress of the United States shall establish a 
maximum speed limit greater or less than 55 mph, the state highway 
commission may adopt" a different speed limit.41 Moreover, the Kansas 
legislature provided that the law "shall expire on the date when the 
Congress of the United States shall remove all restrictions on max-
imum speed limits."·2 The defendant in State v. Dumler,4s challenged the 
law as "an unlawful delegation and surrender of the legislative power 
of the state of Kansas to the Congress of the United States,"44 arguing 
that "Congress dictates the Kansas maximum speed limit" and "will 
continue to do so until it elects to return the power to the Kansas 
legislature, if ever."·5 The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the statute, 
reasoning that the state legislature had not delegated to Congress the 
authority to set speed limits in Kansas; the legislature had merely 
enacted a law to become operational upon the happening of a 
contingency.46 The court stated that the congressional decision to set a 
new speed limit in order for states to qualify for federal funds did not 
establish a speed limit for Kansas, but only authorized the state high-
way commissioner to establish a new speed limit, and thus was not an 
impermissible delegation:7 
state agencies. The Montana court stated, "No state that we can find has approved a 
delegation of sovereign power involved here for mandatory action in the future, based 
upon federal law." 635 P.2d at 1286. 
,old. The court remarked that a "more blatant hand over of the sovereign power of this 
state to federal jurisdiction is beyond our keen." The court, however, stopped short of 
invalidating the statute completely because to do so would "invite chaos" on the high-
ways, and do grave damag(' to the state by disqualifying it from receiving federal funds. 
Id. at 1287. The court retained jurisdiction until the statute was properly amended . 
• IState v. Dumler, 559 P.2d 798. Prior to 1974, the maximum speed limits in Kansas 
were 70 mph during daylight and 60 mph at night on roads and highways outside cities, 
and 75 mph during daylight and iO mph at night on interstate highways. 559 P.2d at 800. 
42559 P.2d at 801. 
·'Id. 
44559 P.2d at 802. 
"Id. 
"Id. at 803-04. 
"The Kansas court found the reasoning in City of Pittsburgh v. Robb, 143 Kan. I, 53 
P.2d 203 (1936), and State v. Padley, 237 N.W.2d 883 persuasive. Robb involved a 
legislative enactment authorizing municipalities to issue industrial revenue bonds to 
fund public utility construction. The law was enacted in order that Kansas municipalities 
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C. State Adoption of Provisions of the Federal Tax Code 
Anderson v. Tiemann48 involved a challenge to Nebraska's state income 
tax also on grounds of impermissible delegation. Pursuant to authority 
granted by a constitutional amendment which provided that "the 
legislature may adopt an income tax based upon the laws of the United 
States,"49 the Nebraska legislature enacted a comprehensive income tax 
act. Section one of the Act provided that any term in the Act "shall have 
the same meaning as when used in a comparable context in the laws of 
the United States relating to federal income taxes,"';o and that "laws of 
the United States" included the Internal Revenue Service regulations 
as "may be or become effective, at any time or from time to time, for the 
taxable year."51 Although the court agreed with the challenger that this 
section made future tax laws of the United States automatically effec-
tive c:tS part of Nebraska tax law, the court disagreed that this therefore 
constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the federal 
government. The determining factor was the constitutional amend-
ment. Although the court reaffirmed an earlier decision which held 
adoption of future federal law improper, 52 in this case, the intent of the 
could qualify for federal funds. This law was challenged as an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power to Congress because the continuing existence of Kansas law 
depended not upon the Kansas legislature but upon Congress. The Robb court rejected 
the challenge stating that the effectiveness of a statute may be made to depend on the 
coming into existence of some future fact, event or condition capable of identification or 
ascertainment as long as the action is complete in itself as an expression of the legislative 
will and itself determines the propriety and expediency of the measure. 53 P.2d at 208. 
Padley involved a Nebraska statute fixing the highway speed limit at 55 mph, but also 
providing that when the President terminated the Emergency Highway Energy Con-
servation Act, the permissible speed limit would be 75 mph. The statute also provided 
that if Congress amended the conservation act, the maximum speed should be 75 mph 
"or such speed :!s Congress requires for compliance with such act, whichever is the 
lesser." The court upheld the statute. It first stated that a legislature can make a law 
operative on the happening of a certain contingency. 23i N.W.2d at 885. Second, it 
rejected defendant's position that the statute would not have been adopted had Congress 
not made federal road funds contingent upon a 55 mph limit, a'nd that this "coercion" 
rendered the statute unconstitutional. Id. The court stated that it is the "privilege of 
Congress to fix the terms upon with federal money allotments to the state shall be made 
and it is entirely optional with the states to accept or reject such offers. Id. 
'"182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967). 
49 155 N.W.2d at 325. 
MId. 
"Id. 
"Id. at 325-36. The Nebraska court reaffirmed its decision in Smithberger v. Banning, 
129 Neb. 651, 262 N. W. 492 (1935) in which the court had invalidated a I ¢ per gallon 
O--A';'''~ lax to provide assistance to Nebraska citizens eligible under federal legislation 
for public assistance. The state law was declared unconstitutional as an impermissible 
delegation because at the time the state statute was passed, Congress had not enacted any 
laws providing for public assistance. 262 N.W. at 497. 
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constitutional amendment was to permit adoption of future law. The 
court held that if the state constitution so provides, it is not an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power for a state automatically to 
adopt future federallaw.5s 
D. State Adoption of Federal Price Control Laws 
In City o/Cleveland v. Piskura,54 an ordinance made it a city offense to 
violate any commodity ceiling price fixed by the federal government 
pursuant to the federal Emergency Price Control Act. Following the 
"generally accepted principle that a state legislature cannot delegate 
legislative power to a federal agency,"55 the Ohio Supreme Court ruled 
the ordinance unconstitutional as "prices are determined by a ... 
federal agency over whom city council has no authority or control."56 
The Cleveland case should be compared to People v. Sell, 57 which 
upheld a Detroit statute which adopted regulations of the federal 
Office of Price Administration. The court ruled that there was no 
improper delegation of legislative power because Congress had the 
power to regulate prices in Detroit pursuant to its war powers under 
article 1, section 8 of the federal constitution.58 
1. Analysis 
As the cases discussed above illustrate, not all courts take the rigid 
approach that all attempts by states to adopt future federal law consti-
tute an unlawful delegation of legislative power; although every court 
recognized that a delegation problem may exist when future federal 
law is adopted by a state statute, sume Sldlutes have been upheld. 
"155 N.W.2d at 327-39. Accord, Garlin v. Murphy, 51 Mise. 2d 477, 273 N.Y.S.2d 374 
(1966) (construing N.Y. CONST. art. Ill, § 22.) The Anderson court relied primarily on 
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950) which discussed an 
Alaska statute which adopted as Alaska law the Internal Revenue Code of the United 
States "as now in effect or hereafter amended." Id. at 815. Although the court did not 
rule on the delegation issue, it noted the laudable goals furthered by the statute: 
legislative time saving, uniformity, and convenience to the taxpayers.ld. at 816--17. 
51 145 Ohio St. 144,60 N.E.2d 919 (1945). 
5560 N.E.2d at 925. 
,sld. 
"310 Mich. 305,17 N.W.2d 193 (1945). 
58 17 N.W.2d at 199. The court stated that because the ordinance merely added the 
city's enforcement sanction to the federal law already in force within fhe city, it was 
"merely augmentative" of the federal act. 17 N. W .2d at 199. The court distinguished 
Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935), and Hutchins v. Mayo, 197 So. 495 
on the ground that those cases involved intrastate matters entrusted to the states by the 
federal Constitution, and did not involve an attempt of a local government to merely 
cooperate in effectuating regulations already applicable to local citizens. 17 N.W.2d at 
200. 
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However, an analysis of the reasoning employed by the courts suggests 
that such approaches are not useful. 
In upholding the Missouri drug statute, the Thompson court distin-
guished Dougall (which had invalidated Washington's drug law) hold-
ing that the drug statutes from the two states were "significantly differ-
ent," and that the roles of the two respective state agencies were also 
different. The author does not find the above reasoning persuasive. 
Although the statutes did differ in that the one invalidated provided 
that if the federal government classified a drug, "the substance shall be 
controlled" by the state, while the valid statute provided that "the 
Division of Health shall similarly control," both statutes mandated the 
same procedure for the state agencies to follow. In both statutes, no 
rulemaking proceeding was required unless the agency objected; the 
dim'rent result in Thompson thus cannot be justified on this ground. 
Thompson also relied on the fact that the Missouri Division of Health's 
decision not to object was to be based on consideration of various 
factors such as the substance's potential for abuse, and potential for 
addiction,59 and therefore, the court reasoned the drug's classification 
was not a product of agency inaction but a result of reasoned agency 
consideration. There are a few problems with this reasoning. First, not 
only did the Missouri statute fail to require any public procedures for 
the Division to make a "no object" decision, but it also did not even 
require the Division to publish any findings for its "no object" decision; 
in Thompson, no reasons were ever stated.60 Faced with a bare order of 
no objection, the Thompson court was required to rely on a presumption 
of regularity that such findings were in fact made.61 Second, because 
the procedure for adopting federal drug laws was identical in Missouri 
;!'The Missouri statute was based on the Vnif. Controlled Substances Act § 201, 9 
V.L.A. 212, 214 (1979) which provides in part that a substance shall be controlled based 
on the following factors: 
I) the actual or relative potential for abuse; 
2) the scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known; 
3) the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance; 
4) the history and current pattern of abuse; 
5) the scope, duration, and significance of abuse; 
6) the risk to the public health; 
7) the potential of the substance to produce physical or physiological dependence 
liability; and 
8) whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled. 
~ .. (:::~,~ \'. Thompson, G2'l S. W.~d at 301 n.5. See also State v. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. 
150,461 A.2d 550 (1983); Feldman, The Delegation of Powers Problem of Section 201 of the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 9 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 143 (1980); Commissioners 
Prcfatof\' Note, Vnif. Controlled Substances Act, 9 V.L.A. 146 (1979). 
00627 S.W.2d at 301; see also 627 S.W.2d at 304 (Bardgett, j., concurring). 
61 627 S.W.2d at 301. 
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and Washington, the agency in Washington would have to go through 
the same decision making process in its "no object" conclusion as would 
the Missouri agency. Therefore, the nature of the state agency's de-
cisionmaking process to reach a "no object" does not support the 
Thompson result. 
The major weakness with the Thompson opinion is that it fails to 
address the delegation problem. A delegation issue exists in these drug 
cases because a federal law is made part of a state's law without any 
evaluation by the state's elected officials of the wisdom of that law when 
applied to its citizens. Both the Missouri and Washington statutes do 
not require elected officials to consider the wisdom of the federal law. 
Although the wording may differ, the difference is not significant 
because in essence, both statutes merely provide that if a state agency 
does not object, the drug classified by federal law is classified under 
state law.52 The distinction between the two cases cannot be justified 
based on the language of the statutes. The real explanation seems to be 
the difference in the courts' attitudes toward the wisdom of the adop-
tion of federal law. The Washington court's conclusion apparently was 
based on its view that state adoption is unwise, while the Missouri court 
accepted the virtues of state adoption of federal law . A problem exists, 
however, in that the real issue-the application of the delegation 
doctrine in relation to the utility and wisdom of state adoption-was 
ignored by both courts in favor of an overly formalistic approach. 
Based on a reading of Thompson and Dougall, one might draw the 
following conclusions: A statute which provides for the adoption of 
future federal law will not constitute an impermissible delegation of 
legislative power if the statute requires the state agency to do some-
thing. How small this "something" can be is not yet clear. What is clear, 
however, is that no public procedures need be held, no findings need 
be published, and as long as the order of no objection is signed, courts 
will not probe the mental processes of the agency to ascertain what, if 
anything, the agency did.63 Furthermore, Thompson and Dougall imply 
that if the statute is "carelessly" drafted to make federal law part of 
state law without any state agency action, the statute will be held 
unconstitutional even if the state agency does have a statutory role. To 
be valid, the statute should not speak of the law being automatically 
adopted, but should speak of the agency automatically adopting the 
federal law. 
62See Feldman, supra note 59 at 143. 
6'ld. See generally Clifford, The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective View, 30 AD. L. REV. 234, 
276-87 (1978). 
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It is submitted that these conclusions do not satisfactorily address the 
delegation issue presented by state adoption of federal law. 
The highway speed limit cases discussed above also illustrate mis-
placed reliance on linguistic differences in two statutes. One statute was 
upheld, the other invalidated, even though the nature of the state 
activity required for state adoption of federal law did not differ signifi-
cantly. As discussed above, the statute which provided that the attorney 
general "shall" set a speed limit if required to do so by the federal 
government in order to receive federal highway funds was held invalid 
as an unconstitutional delegation, while a state statute which set a speed 
limit but provided that it "shall expire when Congress ... removes all 
restrictions on maximum speed limits" was upheld as a permissible 
contingent delegation. The difference in the courts' conclusions does 
not appear justified by the statutory language. In both states, the state 
highway speed limit is automatically pegged to future decisions of 
Congress over which neither state legislature has control. The prob-
lems of political accountability and responsibility upon which the de-
legation doctrine are based are not more (or less) satisfactorily resolved 
by one statute or the other. The drafting of the Kansas statute in 
contingent terms does not make it any less mandatory or any less 
"automatic" than the Montana statute: 
Equally unsatisfying is the reasoning employed by Anderson to up-
hold Nebraska's tax statutes. The determining factor which upheld 
Nebraska's adoption of future federal tax law without requiring any 
action by a state agency was a provision in the Nebraska Constitution 
which empowered the legislature to "adopt an income tax based upon 
the laws of the United States." It is submitted that this language does 
not compel the conclusion that Nebraska can adopt future changes in 
the federal tax law without any consideration by the state officials of the 
federal changes. The more conventional interpretation of the constitu-
tional provision would be that it limited the Nebraska legislature to 
enact an income tax which could only be based upon the federal tax 
code as it existed at the time of the amendment. Other courts consis-
tently have interpreted statutes to deny the legislature the power to 
adopt future federal law in order to uphold their constitutionality.54 
The Nebraska court, however, going beyond the plain language of the 
amendment,65 interpreted the amendment not as a limitation on the 
64See, e.g., Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers. ~29 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976); Ex Parte 
McCurley. 390 So. 2rl 25, 29 (Ala. 1980); State v. Workman. 183 N.W.2d at 913; See also 
Kellems v. Brown. 163 Conn. 478,313 A.2d 53 (1972). appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099.93 
S. Ct. 911. 34 L. Ed. 678 (1973). 
6'155 N.W.2d at 328-32. 
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legislature, but as an expansion of its powers. By doing so, the court 
gave the Nebraska legislature broader powers in the income tax area 
than the legislature would be given in any other area. It is submitted 
that the Nebraska court's sweeping construction of the constitutional 
amendment without any substantive or procedural limits amounted to 
approval of the legislature to abdicate its legislative responsibility in the 
income tax area to the federal government. 
The author similarly does not find the price control cases satisfying 
in their approaches. The Ohio statute was held invalid because of the 
"generally accepted principle" that state legislatures cannot delegate 
power to the federal agencies; yet the court failed to provide any 
meaningful analysis of this principle or any discussion as to whether 
the policies which purport to support this principle were applicable to 
the municipal ordinance before it. On the other hand, a similar Detroit 
ordinance was held valid because Congress, if it had chosen to do so, 
could have regulated prices in Detroit pursuant to its war powers. It is 
submitted that Congress' potential to regulate local activity does not 
justify delegation of state powers to regulate the lives of state citizens to 
the federal government. The mere existence of congressional powers 
such as the war powers or commerce power cannot justify state abdica-
tion of all policymaking to the federal government. Federalism con-
templates accountability at both the federal and state level. The Michi-
gan court's suggestion that a delegation problem is not present because 
the receiver of the power, i.e. Congress, already has that power,66 
therefore should be rejected. 
Other approaches to the state adoption of future federal law are 
equally lacking. It has been argued that state statutes automatically 
adopting future federal law do not constitute impermissible delegation 
of legislative power because the state legislature can always repeal the 
authority it has given.67 This argument is nothing less than a call for 
abolition of the entire delegation doctrine.68 Under this reasoning, all 
state delegations to state agencies also would have to be upheld because 
of the legislature'S power to repeal the state agency's enabling statute. 
The delegation doctrine does serve useful purposes;69 resolution of the 
"People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305,17 N.W.2d 193, 199 (1945). 
"See Anderson v. Tiemann, 155 N.W.2d at 327. 
(;'Mermin, supra note 3, at 24-25. 
69See, e.g., DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.15 (1958); Rosenberg, Delegation 
and Regulatory Reform: Letting the President Change the Rules, 89 YALE L.J. 561, 575-78 
(1980); Note, Rethinking the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 B.U.L. REV. 257 (1982); Schwartz, 
Some Recent Administrative Law Trends: Delegation and Judicial Review, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 
208 (1982). 
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state adoption issue does not require destruction of the delegation 
doctrine. 
Another approach has been consistently to construe the statute as 
not adopting future federal law , but only federal law as it existed at the 
time the adopting statute was enacted. 70 This reasoning is based on the 
principle that courts should construe a statute to uphold its validity, 
rather than try to find reasons to invalidate it. 71 Related to this 
approach is that of severability. Here the court strikes down only the 
futUJe impact of the statute, but upholds the adoption of existing 
federal law.72 One problem with these approaches is that legislative 
intent may be ignored. More importantly, however, these cases avoid 
the issue of the validity of state adoption of federal law rather than 
resolve it. 
2. Summary 
The reasonings which courts have employed in order to invalidate or 
uphold state laws adopting future federal law are unsatisfactory. Cases 
have been distinguished on bases which are not consequential, and 
significant similarities between statutes have been ignored or deemed 
not crucial. Courts have construed provisions of state codes or state 
constitutions broadly or narrowly in an inconsistent fashion in order to 
reach a desired conclusion yet still uphold the "general principle" that 
state adoption of federal law is invalid because it constitutes imper-
missible delegation. Rigid adherence to this general principle has led to 
strained reasoning and very little analysis of the policy implications of 
state adoption of federal law and the delegation doctrine. It is the 
author's opinion that what is needed is a new approach to the issue of 
state adoption of federal law. A proposal that courts develop a policy-
oriented approach related to the substantive area of regulation is the 
focus of the remainder of this article. 
70State v. Workman, 183 N.W.2d 911 involved a Nebraska 'statute which defined 
depressant or stimulant drug to mean inter alia any drug containing a derivative of 
barbituric acid which has been designated under section 502(d) of the federal act as 
habit-forming. The term "federal act" was defined to mean the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, and all amendments thereto. The court ruled that there wuuld be merit to 
the contention that the statute properly delegated legislative power "if we were to 
construe the statute to include federal regulations or law promulgated or enacted after 
the passage of the statute." 183 N.W.2d at 913. But the court refused to do this, and 
upheld the statute because there can be "little question but that incorporation by 
reference is permitted in Nebraska if the incorporation is of an existing law or regula-
tion." Id. 
"See, e.g., Yelle v. Bishop, 347 P.2d at 1091. See generally 2A SANDS, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 57.24 (4th ed. 1973). 
72See, e.g., People v. DeSilva, 189 N.W.2d 362. 
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IV. A NEW APPROACH TO TESTING THE VALIDITY 
OF STATE STATUTES AUTOMATICALLY ADOPTING 
FUTURE FEDERAL LAW 
In all matters regarding the delegation oflegislative power, there is a 
potential conflict between the values embodied in a democratic form of 
government-which emphasizes policy decisionmaking by elected of-
ficials whose accountability and responsibility to the electing citizenry 
legitimate the power-and the values of a bureaucratic society-which 
emphasize the need to accomplish certain policy objectives in an 
efficient, uniform, and technically accurate manner. These consider-
ations should playa role in any analysis of the validity of state adoption 
of future federal law. As the next section of this article discusses, the 
resolution of the validity of a particular state's adopting statute should 
depend upon the balancing of the conflicting interests involved in a 
democratic, yet bureaucratic, federalist system of government. 
A. Uniformity 
One of the advantages of state adoption of federal law is that uni-
formity in regulation is achieved. Such uniformity is desirous for a few 
reasons. First, state adoption of federal law avoids the possibility that 
the state and federal laws may require conflicting behavior by reg-
ulated persons. Second, even if the state and federal laws do not 
conflict, but rather complement one another, the lack of uniformity 
could create additional burdens and expense for regulated persons in 
their compliance procedures. For example, reporting requirements 
would be simplified-and hence made less expensive-by requiring 
the preparation of the same form. 
Not only does uniformity in law make it more convenient for the 
regulated party, it also promotes simplicity of administration for the 
government." Coordination of compliance procedures between fed-
eral and state governments benefits both government entities. The 
resources of the federal government will benefit the states, whereas the 
federal government could employ a state's enforcement machinery to 
improve compliance. Moreover, if various states enacted statutes 
7~Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d 236, 239 (Alaska 1966); City National Bank of Clinton 
v. Iowa State Tax Comm., 251 Iowa 603, 102 N.W.2d 381, 389 (1960); First Federal 
Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 483,115 A.2d 455, 460 (1955); Horner's 
Market, Inc. v. Tri-Countv Met. Transp. Dist., 467 P.2d at 682; Mermin, supra note 3 at 
.6; Graves, Influence of Congressional Legislation on Legislation in the States, 23 IOWA L. REV. 
519,524 (1938) (duplication of examinations and supervisory efforts avoided in banking 
area). See also State v. Hotel Bar Foods, 18 N.]. 67, 112 A.2d 726 (1955). 
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adopting federal law, uniformity would not only be achieved between 
federal and state governments, but also among the states themselves. 
The shared experiences of the states could also prove very useful in 
improving regulatory schemes. 
The desirability of uniformity in regulation, however, cannot be 
assumed in every instance. In some areas, uniform regulation would be 
contrary to policy concerns which a state legitimately seeks to further. 
Uniformity could stifle regulatory innovation. 7~ In the alternative, even 
assuming the fact that uniformity has some benefit to the regulatory 
scheme under consideration by the state for adoption of future federal 
law, the benefits of uniformity might not outweigh the loss of political 
responsibility and accountability on the part of the state legislature that 
may result from adoption offederallaw. Moreover, uniformity might 
be achieved equally as well by other-perhaps less drastic-methods, 
e.g., through cooperation with the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws.75 
The degree of uniformity desired and the method to accomplish 
uniformity should depend upon the substantive area being regulated. 
The more uniformity will benefit a particular regulatory framework, 
and the less likely that these benefits can be achieved without the 
automatic adoption of future federal law, the more useful is a state 
mechanism which depends upon automatic adoption of future federal 
law. A lack of need for uniformity in a particular substantive area, or 
the ability of other mechanisms to accomplish the desired amount of 
uniformity, should argue against automatic adoption. 
B. Consistency In Policy 
A related factor which must be considered in analyzing a state's 
decision automatically to adopt future federal law is the need for 
consisten~y in policy between the federal government and the states, 
and between the states themselves. When the subject being regulated 
does not involve purely local concerns, but rather involves matters that 
similarly impact both the national and local level, there is greater 
justification for automatic state adoption of future federal law. This 
point was emphasized in Ex Parte Lasswel['6 which upheld California's 
Industrial Recovery Act which, in general, made the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act applicable to intrastate commerce in California. 
"See Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation, 2!lY Minn. 220, 184 N.W.2d 588, 591 
(Minn. 1971); Hutchins v. Mayo, 197 So. 495. 
"Cf Graves, supra note 73, at 521, 537 (state adoption statutes work better than 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). 
76 1 Cal. App. 2d 183,36 P.2d 678 (1934). 
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That court stated that cooperative effort between state and federal 
governments was justified because there was a "nationwide business 
collapse"77 and the "disease is but one and the patient is but one."78 The 
court also held· that coordination was required because if only the 
federal code existed, a business doing interstate commerce would be at 
a disadvantage in competition with the same type of business that 
would be unregulated ifit engaged in only intrastate business.79 When 
there is one "evil," and the goals of both the federal and state govern-
ments are the same, automatic state adoption of future federal law may 
be especially useful. 
On the other hand, when the goals sought to be achieved are differ-
ent on the federal level than those on the state level, state adoption of 
federal law would be unjustified. One reason why automatic state 
adoption of future federal law is disfavored is. that changes in the 
federal law may not fit the policy of the state which is adopting it. BO In 
such circumstances, the citizens of that state are being denied the 
benefit of the considered judgment of their elected officials. Hence, 
when the policy to be furthered by the federal scheme is different from 
a policy deemed appropriate by the state, automatic adoption of fed-
eral law is inappropriate. 
A possible example of this is Crowley v. ThornbroughBI involving an 
Arkansas minimum wage law which required government contractors 
in Arkansas to pay wages based upon wages that "will be determined by 
the Secretary of Labor of the United States to be prevailing for the 
corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics" on similar federal 
projects.B2 A list which the Secretary of Labor maintained pursuant to 
the Davis-Bacon ActB3 was used by the Arkansas State Labor Depart-
ment. The Arkansas Supreme Court held the statute invalid because it 
"failed to establish a standard" for formulating a wage scale; it merely 
"delegated to the Secretary of Labor of the United States the right to fix 
the minimum wage scale" in Arkansas.B4 This conclusion is warranted if 
the law had been adopted without consideration by the Arkansas 
legislature of the policy implications of the Davis-Bacon Act in relation 
to federal construction projects, and whether these policy implications 
7736 P.2d at 687. 
781d. 
79Jd. 
B"Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d at591; Dawson v. Hamilton, 314 
S.W.2d 532. 
81 226 Ark. 768, 294 S.W.2d 62 (1956). 
B'[d. at 63-64. 
8'40 U.S.C. § 276 e/ seq. (1976 & Supp. VI 1981). 
84294 S.W.2d at 66. 
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conformed to the needs of Arkansas. Without consideration of these 
policy implications, the Arkansas legislature would be abdicating its 
legislative function to the federal government by enacting the adopting 
statute. If, however, the Arkansas legislature had considered how the 
Davis-Bacon Act and future changes in the act would impact upon 
Arkansas, and if the legislature decided that the policies being pursued 
by the federal government under the Davis-Bacon Act were the poli-
cies which it wanted Arkansas to pursue, adoption of the federal 
scheme, even as amended in the future, would be appropriate. A 
reasoned decision by a state legislature to conform state policy to 
federal policy is not an abdication of responsibility.s, 
On the other hand, it would be inappropriate for a state to adopt, as 
its regulatory scheme, law enacted by the federal government in fur-
therance of an unrelated federal regulatory interest. Two cases involv-
ing state adoption of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regula-
tions illustrate this point. Cheney v. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad CO:S6 
involved an Arkansas tax law which taxed railroads after allowing 
deductions "to be determined under the ICC Act pursuant to the ICC's 
standard classification of accounts."87 One basis of the court's holding 
that the statute was invalid was that the ICC's standard classification of 
accounts was promulgated in order to improve the reporting require-
ments of railroads to help the ICC monitor possible rate fixing agree-
ments. Since the ICC regulations were not based on any income tax 
policy considerations, adoption of these federal standards for state tax 
law purposes was improper.88 The second case, Dawson v. Hamilton,89 
involved a Kentucky statute which fixed the standard time in Kentucky 
as the standard time fixed by "Act of Congress or by any order of the 
ICC."90 Part of the Kentucky court's reasoning in invalidating the law 
·'See Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972) where the court construed a statute 
which exempted from a Florida gun possession and registration statute firearms "law-
fully owned and possessed under provisions of federal law." Id. at 664. The court 
discussed this provision saying: 
it would seem reasonable that the Legislature would want to exempt from the penalties 
of the statute weapons owned and possessed by an ordinary law-abiding citizen, whose 
~lICI. law-abiding character may be inferred from the fact that such citizen took the 
trouble to register his weapon with the proper federal authority. It is reasonable to 
assume that a person owning such weapons with criminal intent would not register the 
same, thereby according an opportunity for his identity to become known if such 
weapon is later found to have been involved in a criminal offense. 
ld. at 667. See aLw State v. Hotel Bar Foods, N.J., 112 A.2d at 732. 
86239 Ark. 870, 394 S.W.2d 731 (1965) . 
• '/d. at 733. 
"'Jd. 
89314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958). 
9Old. at 534. 
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was that the ICC regulations were based upon considerations of inter-
state trucking and railroading which had no relationship to the interest 
of Kentucky in setting time zones. 91 Future changes by the ICC would 
be based on considerations of interstate commerce. not on what was 
best for Kentucky. Because the problems being addressed by the 
federal government were different than those purportedly being 
addressed by the Kentucky statute, the court held it to be improper for 
the Kentucky legislature to adopt the federal law. 
C. Efficiency 
Another factor to be considered is the extent to which automatic 
state adoption of federal law promotes governmental and regulatory 
efficiency. Some subjects of government regulation involve areas 
which are highly technical or require a high degree of expertise in 
order to be effectively regulated. Just as in some areas, where the need 
for expertise has justified delegation of state legislative power to a state 
agency, the need for expertise may justify the delegation of state 
legislative power to the federal government. 92 Automatic state adop-
tion of future federal law perhaps should be favored in those matters 
where the federal government possesses expertise far greater than that 
possessed by any state agency, or in those matters where it is more 
reasonable that the federal government will obtain the necessary ex-
pertise. Moreover, in those areas where a national experience is bene-
ficial in order to best determine a regulatory posture, state adoption of 
federal law may be desirable. In addition, where effective regulatory 
policy can only be developed by the allocation of resources which are 
beyond the ability of a state, but are available on the federal level, state 
adoption of federal law may be advisable. Even if costs are not impossi-
ble for the state to handle, efficient use of resources may indicate that 
state reliance on federal law is preferable. On the other hand, if the 
matter is within the technical and financial ability of a state, there 
would seem to be no reason why the state legislature should delegate 
legislative power to the federal government. 
A related factor is the need for constant monitoring and possible 
revision.93 If this monitoring function can be better handled by the 
federal government due to its superior expertise or resources, auto-
91Id. at 536. Cf Dearborn Independent v. City of Dearborn. 331 Mich. 447. 49 N.W.2d 
370 (1951 )(staLUtory requirement that newspapers used to publish legal notices shall 
have been admitted by the U.S. Post Office department for transmission as mail matter of 
the sewnd class was invalidated). 
"'Anderson V. Tiemann. 155 N.W.2d at 328; State v. Hotel Bar Foods. 112 A.2d. at 
731; Cf Crowly v. Thornbrough, 294 S.W.2d at 64. 
9'Anderson V. Tiemann, 1:-,:; N.W.2d at 328. 
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matic state adoption of federal law may be preferable than sole state 
control. As one court wrote in upholding a state statute adopting 
federal drug laws: 
The legislature is not constantly in session, and, therefore, even if its mem-
bers were all trained chemists and pharmacists, it is impossible for them to 
keep abreast of the constantly changing drugs and medications and their 
inherent dangers .... By enacting [the adoption statute], the legislature 
indicates that it if had the time and expertise it would control all substances 
controlled by the federal government." 
Other courts have upheld state adoption of federal law because in "an 
increasingly complex society ... it is impractical, if not impossible, to 
summons the legislature to meet every new contingency."95 This may 
be especially true in areas where quick action is needed. If automatic 
adoption were not permitted, the lag between the time the federal 
government recognized a need to change a regulatory scheme and the 
adoption of that change by the state may defeat or at least hamper the 
"State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d at 303. 
·'Mason v. State, 12 Md. App. 655, 280 A.2d 753, 766 (1971); Accord, State v. Ciccarelli, 
461 A.2d 550 where the court rejected an argument that a statute which classified 
substances as controlled dangerous substances when that substance was classified by 
federal authorities and no objection was made by the Maryland Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene was an unconstitutional delegation of power by the General Assem-
bly to the U.S. government. MD. CODE ANN. § 278(c) (rep!. vol. 1982) provided that any 
new substance which is designated as controlled under federal law shall be similarly 
controlled under this subheadillg unless the Department objeus to sudl inclusion or 
rescheduling. If an objection was made, a public hearing would be held. The defendants 
argued that this section allowed the federal agency to create state law. The court began its 
analysis of the issue by stating that ... "unless the power to delegate is specifically 
conferred upon it by the constitution, the Legislature may not abdicate its lawmaking 
role to another. Nevertheless, it is well settled that the Legislature may delegate to 
subordinate officials the power to carry laws into effect, even though such delegation 
requires the exerLise of a certain amount of discretion which may be regarded as police 
power." 461 A.2d at 554. The court also explained that a delegation is valid as long as it 
"gUides and restrains the discretion vested in the subordinate official by standards 
sufficient to protect the citizen against arbitrary or unreasonable exercise." ld., quoting, 
Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349, 360, 131 A.2d 801 (1925). The court ruled that the drug 
statut" ".;dlislietlthc rcyuin:lllcnt that it 'guide anti restrain' the discretion of subordinate 
offices." Because the statute conferred upon the state agency a 30-day period in which to 
decide to accept or object to the inclusion of the federallv forbidden substance, "it is the 
state agcncy, not the federal onc, that makes the final determination." ld. The court cited 
approvingly State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d 298; Ex Parte McCurley, 390 So. 2d 25; 
State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 1977) and Brown v. State, 398 So. 2d 784, 787, cert. 
denied. 398 So. 2d 7R7 (Ala. Ct. A pp. 1981). The court rejected State v. Dougall, 89 Wash. 
2d I Ill, 57U l'.:.!d 135 (1977) because "ifthe Washington court's views were to prevail. the 
maxim of ignorantia juris non excusant, would be meaningless." ld. at 556. The court 
also distin,"':""'" " ...... ,. Rodriguez. 379 So. 2d IOR4 in that the statute there had 
provided that the state agency shall add any substance as controlled if the U.S. DEA so 
classified it. That staLUte made the state agency a 'rubber stamp,' 461 A.2d at 555 11.4. See 
alm Feldman, supm note 5~:, <it 155-61. 
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state's regulatory interests. The public health field has been mentioned 
by a few courts as an example where more flexibility in applying the 
delegation doctrine may be appropriate.96 
The delegation of power to the federal government where expertise 
is involved also may enhance the integrity of the regulatory process. 
Reliance on federal experience and expertise in an area may make 
state regulation more acceptable to regulated persons. An attempt by 
the state to do things differently than the federal government may 
cause problems of accuracy, and create confusion. On the other hand, 
a federal regulatory program which itself has been inconsistent or of 
questionable utility should not be adopted by a state government. 
D. Burden on Regulated Parties 
Another consideration is whether automatic adoption of federal law 
would create additional significant burdens on regulated parties. In 
those areas where persons already are obligated to conform their 
actions in accord with federal standards, the effect of state adoption 
only would be to grant the state a power to enforce federal standards in 
state court. In such areas of concurrent regulation, this additional 
enforcement power would not be a significant burden upon regulated 
persons.97 If, however, the area of regulation is one where the federal 
regulation has been developed to apply only to a limited segment of the 
industry or populace which Congress could have selected to be reg-
ulated, and the state's decision to regulate is based on its conclusion 
that the scope of the federal regulation is not broad enough, considera-
tion must be given to the additional burden being placed on newly 
regulated persons in analyzing a state law adopting federal law. 
V. THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
The state adoption of federal law issue should be addressed in terms 
of the governmental policies being sought, and the substantive area 
""Mason v. State, 280 A.2d at 766; State v. Ciccarelli, 461 A.2d at 554. 
9'Cf. McHenry State Bank v. Harris. 61 II\. Dec. 547, 89 II\. 2d 542, 434 N.E.2d 1144 
(III. 1982), where plaintiff contended that the Illinois General Assembly had unlawfully 
delegated to the Federal Reserve Board the power to define branch hankin~. The Illinois 
Bank Holding Act provided that in certain situations the transferor of shares in a bank 
shall be deemed to be in direct control of its transferee unless the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve Board determines that the transferor is not actually capable of 
controlling the transferee. 434 N.E.2d at 1148. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 17, § 2502(d)(4)(iii) 
(Smith-Hurd 1981). Tht: Ulun rejected the attack on the statute because the Act did not 
purport to confer powers on the Federal Reserve Board which it did not already have 
under the Federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. See also Samson v. State, 27 Md. 
App. 326, 341 A.2d 817 (197:». 
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being regulated. In matters where uniform regulation among the 
states and the federal government is desirable in order to implement a 
consistent national and local policy, to further identical state and 
federal goals, and to combat one "evil" which impacts on both the 
national and local level equally, and where the area being regulated 
involves matters which are highly technical, requires a level of exper-
tise beyond that available to the states, requires a commitment of 
resources greater than what can be allocated by the states, and requires 
constant revision and quick response to new developments, state adop-
tion of federal law should be encouraged. This is especially true if the 
state adoption of federal law would not create additional significant 
burdens on regulated persons, and if the efficiency of the regulatory 
process would be improved by state adoption. On the other hand, in 
those matters where local interests differ from national policy goals, 
where the federal law being adopted is premised on policy goals 
unrelated to the state regulatory scheme, where the states do have the 
expertise and resources to develop their own policy without a signifi-
cant loss in regulatory efficiency, or where the burden on regulated 
persons is vastly increased with no concomitant increase in policy 
achievement, automatic state adoption of federal law should be dis-
couraged. 
Under this approach, the legislature's function is to determine, 
based on its own independent evaluation, whether the factors dis-
cussed above indicate that adoption of federal law is desirable. The 
legislature in order to fulfill its legislative duty must consider and 
evaluate these factors to determine whether state policy goals can he 
best served by laws not dependent upon the federal government. 
Additionally, to ensure that the state legislature's decision to delegate 
legislative power to the federal government does not amount to an 
abdication of its legislative responsibility, it is submitted that the legisla-
ture should not only be required to make findings on each factor, but 
also to include in such findings an explanation why state adoption of 
federal law best serves local needs. This findings requirement should 
be seen as satisfying the requirement of the delegation doctrine that 
basic policy choices be made by politically responsible officials. 
In its determination whether state adoption of federal law is 
appropriate, the state legislature also might consider modified adop-
tion approaches. For example, a state statute could be drafted which 
adopts federal law, but it could also require periodic review of the 
feoerallaw by the state. In matters where the balance of factors leans 
toward but does not compel state adoption, the statute perhaps should 
he drafted so that the federal law does not become effective as state law 
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until the federal law is accepted by either the legislature or a state agency 
after public procedures. Alternatively, instead of a statute which re-
quires the state to accept the federal law , the statute could be drafted so 
that the federal law becomes effective as state law unless the legislature 
or state agency after public procedure rejects it. A legislature's decision 
to enact an "accepting-adoption" or "rejecting-adoption" statute 
should be based on the balancing of factors discussed in this article. A 
"rejecting-adoption" scheme would be preferable in cases where there 
is a close issue as to whether adoption of federal law is appropriate. An 
"accepting-adoption" statute may be preferable in matters where the 
balance of factors makes a more persuasive showing in favor of adop-
tion. Clear cases in favor of adoption could lead to an automatic 
adoption mechanism. In all cases, legislative findings and explanations 
would be required. 
The judicial function under the proposed approach is to ensure that 
the appropriate findings have been made by the legislature, and that 
these findings have rational support in the legislative record. The 
judicial role is necessarily limited in order that it not usurp the legisla-
ture's role of determining state policy. The court's inquiry should end 
once it is satisfied that the appropriate factors have been considered, 
and that the legislature's analysis of these factors and consequent 
conclusions are reasonable. 
VI. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED 
NEW APPROACH 
The first part of this article discussed the analyses which courts have 
employed in testing the validity of state statutes adopting federal drug 
laws, federal highway speed limit laws, federal tax laws, and federal 
price control laws. Dissatisfaction with the courts' analyses led to a 
proposed new approach. This section will apply this new approach to 
these four regulatory areas. 
A. State Adoption of Federal Drug Laws 
As discussed earlier, various state laws make drugs controlled by the 
federal government controlled drugs under state law. Applying the 
proposed analysis presented in this article, it would appear that state 
adoption of federal drug laws is legitimate for a few reasons. The 
impact of uncontrolled dangerous drugs is the same on the state and 
federal level. There is one evil being combatted by both governments. 
The goals of both the state and federal government in their decisions to 
regulate dangerous drugs are identical. The decision to control a 
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particular drug is based on similar scientific factors, e.g., potential for 
addiction.98 These scientific decisions are most likely better made by 
federal agencies which have better technical facilities and greater re-
sources to study the impact of drugs. Because of the recent rapid 
increase in drug activity, and technological advances in recent years, 
effective regulation of drugs requires constant review and the ability to 
respond quickly to developments.99 Uniformity as to what drugs are 
controlled on the state and federal level does not impose a burden on 
regulated persons beyond that imposed if the state did not follow the 
federal scheme. 'oo The threat of federal prosecution is a sufficient 
conduct regulation mechanism so that state enforcement would not be 
imposing a new burden on regulated persons. Likewise, if the laws 
were not uniform, regulated persons' conduct would not be any differ-
ent if the laws were uniform; every person would have to conform to 
the more onerous law. Uniformity would also promote the integrity of 
the regulatory scheme. When the same drugs are classified as danger-
ous in every jurisdiction, the public acceptance of the correctness of 
that classification is enhanced as compared to when different jurisdic-
tions treat the same drugs differently. Enforcement of the law is also 
benefitted by such uniformity of law. Cooperation between law en-
forcement officials is benefitted by the same drug classification system. 
State adoption of federal drug laws therefore should be favored. A 
state decision to adopt federal law should not be held invalid as long as 
the legislature's decision is based on full consideration of the goals 
sought by the state, and a decision that these goals are best achieved by 
adoption of federal law. At the least, statutes which empower a state 
agency to o~ject to the drug's inclusion on a state's dangerous drug list 
after being so classified by the federal government should be upheld. 
This mechanism of state review should be seen as a sufficient control by 
the state over the decisions of the federal government so that a delega-
tion argument should be rejected. lOl 
9'See generally supra, note 58. 
""Mason v. State. 280 A.2d at 766; State v. Ciccarelli, 461 A.2d at 554. 
'''''Samson v. State, 341 A.2d at 823. 
'O'State v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541,568 P.2d 514 (1977) involved an Idaho statute which 
pi u\ iueu Lhat no person except listed medical professionals shall dispense drugs re-
quired by the laws of Idaho or the U.S. to be sold on a prescription order. An Idaho 
Board of Pharmacy regulation provided that "a legend drug is one which colltains on its 
immediate, original container, the legend 'Caution: Federal Law Prohibits Dispensing 
without Prescription.'" [d. at 515, n.2. The court rejected an improper delegation 
argument stating that any delegation claim must be "tempered by due consideration for 
the practical context of the problem sought to be remedied, or the policy sought to be 
dTeCleJ." ;d. al :>16, 'Iuo/ing, Dept. of Citrus v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1970). 
Moreover, "regulation of drugs demands particular regard for practical considera-
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B. State Adoption of F~deral Highway 
Speed Limits 
Analysis of the validity of state statutes adopting federal highway 
speed limits involves a different balancing than in the analysis of 
statutes adopting federal drug laws. Unlike the drug area, regulation 
of highway speed limits by the state may involve different policy 
concerns than those involved in its regulation by the federal govern-
ment. The federal government's decision to impose a 55-mile-per-
hour speed limit was primarily an energy conservation statute enacted 
in response to the Arab oil embargo. \02 Congress decided that in order 
to lessen the nation's dependence on unreliable sources of foreign oil, 
conservation measures were needed. Although after the reduction of 
the speed limit on federal highways, traffic deaths did decline, the 
federal decision was mostly a conservation measure and not a safety 
regulation. On the other hand, regulation by state governments of 
highway speed limits primarily is based on safety factors and the 
transportation needs of its citizens. \03 State decisions on the regulation 
of speed limits depend not on foreign oil embargoes, but on popula-
tion density, terrain, distances between transportation points, lighting, 
and other tnmsportation factors. I04 
Because the impact upon regulated persons on the national and state 
level may be disproportionate, uniformity in regulation may not be 
desirable. Different states have different transportation needs because 
of their size, their terrain, the distance between their population cen-
ters, the condition of their roads, and the type of traffic which uses the 
roads. Drivers in Wyoming have different transportation needs than 
drivers in Connecticut. A federal highway policy cannot differentiate 
between these needs. It is the duty of state legislatures to legislate based 
on local conditions and needs; adoption of federal highway law does 
not allow for these considerations. 
tion,"' meaning that because new drugs are being discovered and introduced at an 
unprecendented rate, broad standards of delegation will be upheld. State v. Kellogg, 
supra, at 516. The Idaho court cited an earlier United States Supreme Court decision 
which stated that delegation will not be invalid as long as Congress "dearly delineates the 
general policy" and courts are given the power "to test the application of the policy of the 
agency in light of these legislative declarations." Id. at 517, quoting, American Power & 
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 67 S. Cl. 133,91 L. Ed. 103 (1946). 
lotSee Legislative History to Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) as amended 
by Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-643, 88 Stat. 2281 (1975). See also H. REp. No. 1567, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted -in 1974 U.S. CoNG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 8011, 8019-20. 
losSee MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, 
OmCE OF TRAmC, THE WHY AND How OF SPEED ZoNING (1983). See also Oliny v. People, 
642 P.2d 490,495 (Colo. 1982). 
I04Id. 
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Nor would there be any additional expense to regulated persons if 
the laws were not uniform. Drivers are accustomed to checking speed 
limits whenever they enter upon a new road or cross over into a new 
jurisdiction. Nor would a driver be subject to conflicting regulations 
simultaneously, as he would either be on a state or a federal highway. 
State adoption of federal highway law is also not justified by the 
expertise of the federal government. Highway regulatory policy 
should be based on local conditions and needs which are within the 
expertise of state transportation agencies. Other factors such as the 
need to constantly monitor the regulated subject area and the ability to 
respond quickly to new developments do not apply to highway regula-
tion, and thus countenance against state adoption of federal law. The 
integrity of the regulatory process would also not be diminished by 
different laws since drivers are accustomed to differing speed limits 
based on different types of roads. Nor are there any additional bur-
dens placed on regulated persons by having to change the speed· of 
their vehicles when changing from a federal to a state highway. 
All these factors indicate that state legislatures should retain for 
themselves the policy decisionmaking powers in the highway field, and 
not enact statutes which automatically adopt federal highway law. Of 
course, if the legislature, based on its own analysis, determines that 
federal policy also best serves local interests, state highway law could 
track federal law. An important component of this analysis will 
obviously be the fact that the federal government could withdraw 
highway funds from those states that do not conform with federal 
speed limits. But this coordination does not depend upon automatic 
adoption. Reliance upon an automatic adoption method without thor-
ough state scrutiny of federal and state highway policy goals and the 
impact of withdrawal of federal funds would be improper. 
C. State Adoption of Federal Tax Laws 
When assessing the validity of state statutes adopting federal tax 
laws, the balancing of the various policy factors suggests that adoption 
of federal law would be an abdication of legislative responsibility. The 
most significant factor arguing against permitting states to adopt 
federal law is that the federal tax code is based on numerous political 
and social as well as revenue producing considerations. 105 The same 
political and social considerations which may be significant to federal 
tax policy are not necessarily significant to a state's tax collection 
program.(()6 Unlike the drug law area, the federal and state govern-
""Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d at 591. 
"'"[d. 
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ments are not necessarily attacking one evil. The federal tax code is 
designed not only to produce revenue for the government, but also to 
further various social goals. Before a state legislature enacts legislation 
adopting the federal tax law, it must carefully analyze the policies of 
the federal tax law, and then decide whether these policies will serve 
the interests of its state. It must also predict whether future changes in 
the federal tax laws will be best for the state. Because of the complexity 
of the federal tax law, and the myriad of social policies and political 
considerations upon which it lies, it may be impossible for a state 
legislature to be able to evaluate how federal policy will relate to the 
needs of its state. Faced with the difficult task of balancing all the social, 
political and economical considerations which go into a tax code, 
abdication to the federal government, while it may be tempting to the 
state legislature, should be seen as improper. 
Moreover, because the policies being furthered by the federal gov-
ernment in its tax laws may be different than those desired by the 
states, any expertise developed by the federal government is not re-
levant to the state experience. The federal lnternal Revenue Service 
has expertise in federal tax policy, but none in state tax policy. More-
over, the vast resources of the IRS would not significantly benefit the 
states. Analysis of state tax goals may not benefit from studies relating 
to federal tax policy. It might be argued that the integrity of the tax 
collection system would be advanced if the state and federal tax laws 
were uniform in that consistency between the two could negate an 
attitude of the tax laws' arbitrariness. However, this theory would be 
negated if taxpayers understood that different policies were being 
furthered by the two tax programs. 
Tax law is also not an area where change needs to be made quickly. 
Deliberation by state decisionmakers may be more appropriate than 
automatic adoption of changes in the federal tax law. In fact, consistent 
tax policy to encourage long range planning may be more desirable 
,han quick reaction to a changing economic scene. The impact of a 
particular tax law may also differ significantly on the federal level 
rather than on the state level. A minor tax revision appearing as part of 
a large tax reform bill may have a devastatinQ" impact on a local industry 
if also incorporated into the state code. 
There are reasons, however, which may support state adoption of 
ft::deral tax law. It has been noted that since taxpayers already would be 
aware of the provisions of the federal tax law, it would be less confusing 
to have the terms mean the same thing to a taxpayer subject to both 
federal and state tax laws.1<>7 The cost of compliance would also be 
1Il7Cit\, Nat'l Bank of Clinton v, Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 102 N,W,2d at 389. 
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lessened if the tax laws were uniform because of fewer recordkeeping 
demands. Another possible benefit of state adoption of federal tax law 
is that the taxpayer would not be subjected to potentially conflicting 
demands. Lack of coordination between state and federal tax codes 
could present the taxpayer with situations where whatever decision was 
made would create an additional tax burden. 
The balance of factors seems to argue against automatic state adop-
tion of federal tax law. State legislatures should focus on the policies 
they want to further, and then develop a tax policy consistent with 
those policies. In the event, however, after careful state analysis, it is 
concluded that the federal-tax laws do further the same policies sought 
by the state, uniformity may be appropriate. A mechanism which 
requires tax policy analysis by a state agency before new federal tax law 
is incorporated, however, would be preferable to an automatic adop-
tion provision. At the least, a provision not adopting changes in the 
federal law until public hearings are held by the state should be encour-
aged. Political accountability and responsibility involved in tax deci-
sions should not be avoided by state legislators through an automatic 
adoption statute. This has special importance in the tax field where 
potentially unpopular decisions must be made. It may be easier for 
state legislators to push the responsibility to the federal decisionmakers 
so that the state legislators, when faced with criticism of the state tax 
laws, can blame the federal guvernment for such laws. In the area of 
tax law, however, state legislators should not be able to pass their duty 
to establish policy to the federal government. 
D. State Adoption of Federal Price Control 
Laws and Other Trade Regulation Statutes 
These types of statutes for the most part involve state decisions to 
regulate businesses which are left unregulated by federal standards 
either because the businesses do not engage in interstate commerce, or 
becallse they fall below some sort of statutory minimum, e.g., income 
level. 108 In evaluating this area, careful analysis must be made by the 
state legislature of the policy goals being sought by federal regulation, 
and whether the regulation of local businesses by the state based on 
federal standards would significantly further the achievement of these 
goals without inordinately burdening local businesses. 
State regulation in these trade areas dearly will increase the burden 
on regl'lated persons since without state regulation these businesses 
"'"See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U .S.C. § 213(a)(2)(g) (1982) (amended 
1974) (exempting from Fair Labor Standards Act retail establishments whose annual 
oullar volume of sales is less than $225,0(0). 
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would go unregulated. In order to determine whether this burden is 
justified, the state legislature first must determine whether the policy 
goals of the federal regulatory scheme are consistent with the policy 
goals of the state. If an inconsistency exists, adoption is clearly unwar-
ranted. For example, a state may wish to ease environmental regula-
tions in order to attract new businesses; a state could decide to create 
jobs at the expense of a clean environment. On the other hand, if the 
state and federal goals are consistent, then the state legislature must 
determine the impact on local businesses. For example, worker safety 
regulations under federal standards may create such a burden on small 
local businesses not covered by the federal standards that state adop-
tion of these federal standards would destroy these small businesses. 
Consideration must also be given to the fact that increased costs incur-
red to comply with the regulations would be passed on to local consum-
ers. The state legislature in order to fulfill its legislative duty should be 
required to consider each federal regulatory enactment to decide 
whether the federal standard is appropriate to the state's policy in-
terests. Because automatic adoption does not permit this, automatic 
adoption statutes are inappropriate in trade regulation areas when 
state adoption of federal law means expanding federal regulation to 
cover businesses which the federal government has left unregulated. 109 
Automatic adoption is also undesirable in these areas because it places 
even more power in the hands of entities powerful enough to effect 
federal legislation and federal regulations while concomitantly disen-
franchising local businesses which can assert influence only on the local 
level. A federalist system calls for political accountability and responsi-
bility at both the federal and local levels. To the extent automatic 
adoption of federal law serves to disenfranchise groups which can only 
be effective at the local level, automatic adoption should be avoided. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The issue of state adoption of federal law should be considered in 
light of the regulatory policies sought to be furthered by the state and 
federal governments in relation to the substantive area being reg-
ulated. The overly technical application by the c~urts of the delegation 
doctrine to cases involving state statutes adopting federal law do not do 
this. Although it would be an abdication of legislative power for a state 
legislature to take the naked position that what is good for the federal 
1119See State \'. Reader's Digest Ass'n Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 50 I P.2d 290 (1972); Dep't. 
of Legal Affairs v. Rogers. 329 So. 2<1 2.S7: Rimier \'. Carson. 262 So. 2d 661. 
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government is good for its state, if the legislature engages in thorough 
and reasoned analysis of the regulatory consequences of adoption of 
federal law, and ifit makes appropriate findings explaining why adop-
tion of federal law best serves the interests of the citizens of its state, 
adoption of federal law should not be seen as an impermissible delega-
tion of legislature power from the states to the federal government. 
This article has attempted to identify those factors which the legisla-
ture should consider in its determination whether it should adopt 
federal law. The essential point is not that states should automatically 
adopt federal drug laws, as opposed to federal tax laws; the essential 
point is that the issue of state adoption of federal law is one of substan-
tive regulatory law, and not one which can be adequately handled by an 
overly technical application of the delegation doctrine. The dearth of 
commentary on this issue is surprising considering the importance and 
scope of state statutes which adopt federal law. Hopefully, the 
approach suggested by this article will prove useful to achieving a 
better understanding of the validity and utility of state adoption of 
federal law. 
